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                               For Life Writing and the Public Sphere: 
 
            CRITICAL INJURIES: COLLABORATIVE INDIGENOUS  
                LIFE WRITING AND THE ETHICS OF CRITICISM 
 
 
Publishing one’s life renders it public property, and those who do so cannot (or should 
not) expect that their representation of themselves, and especially of others, will meet 
with universal approval. 
G. Thomas Couser, Vulnerable Subjects: Ethics and Life Writing (199) 
 
Is there harm in life writing? 
Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (159) 
 
 
For well over a decade the imbrication of ethics and literature has been the focus of 
substantial scholarly interest with particular attention paid to how literature intersects 
with public life.1 Paul John Eakin’s question regarding harm in life writing signals a 
similar turn in the critical reading of life writing towards this consideration of ethics. As 
autobiographical theory has shifted from models dependent upon notions of autonomy to 
understandings that foreground relational constructions, analysis of life writing such as 
Eakin’s is beginning to take into account the ethical issues embedded in the 
representation of relational lives. Indeed, in his latest publication Eakin goes further, 
suggesting that he has come “to think of ethics as the deep subject of autobiographical 
discourse” (The Ethics of Life Writing, 6). 
 
In the reading of collaborative Indigenous life writing, the question of harm has long 
been a core concern. Critical attention has tended to focus on the issue of power relations, 
asking how power has been distributed or activated in the production of the collaborative 
work and what traces of power differentials remain inscribed in the published text. 
Underlying these discussions of power is the inferred critical objective of discerning 
instances or aspects of collaboration in which benefit or harm may be detected, either in 
outcomes such as copyrights and royalties, or in terms of the textualisation of Indigenous 
lives and their potential subordination to non-Indigenous discursive control. Publication 
of collaborative texts rightly places both the text and its conditions of production under 
                                                 
1 Amongst the numerous works dealing with the intersection of ethics and literature see: Booth; Nussbaum; 
Adamson, Freadman, and Parker; Rainsford and Woods; and Davis and Womack.  
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public scrutiny and such scrutiny evokes ethical claims. Critics intent upon tracking the 
circulation of power within cross-cultural collaboration are engaged, whether they admit 
it or not, in ethical criticism. The question I would like to ask in this article, then, pertains 
to the engagement that takes place between collaborative Indigenous life writing and its 
critics. While recognising that harm can certainly result from collaborative life writing 
encounters, I also wish to ask whether harm may be occasioned through the criticism of 
collaborative Indigenous life writing, and to consider the implications of such harm, if it 
exists, for literary theory. 
 
                                       Ethical Criticism 
 
Eakin’s interest in the ethics of life writing stems from his critical attention to the 
relational features of identity formation and representation. In his chapter devoted to 
ethics and life writing in How Our Lives Become Stories (1999), Eakin discusses the 
ethical concerns raised in the acknowledgement that all biographical and 
autobiographical representation involves an infringement upon the lives of others. Setting 
the need and respect for privacy and autonomy beside texts from diverse aspects of life 
writing, Eakin asks: “What is right and fair for me to write about someone else? What is 
right and fair for someone else to write about me?” (160). He explores these questions 
through biography, ethnographic autobiography and collaborative autobiography and in 
doing so touches upon issues of ownership and copyright as well as privacy, 
appropriation and ventriloquism, concerns that anyone acquainted with the enormous 
body of Indigenous life writing produced in collaboration with non-Indigenous writers 
and editors will find familiar. In the texts Eakin reads, however, answers do not come 
readily when the implications of relational lives are taken seriously: that the boundaries 
between self and other are porous and shifting and that narratives of self and other are 
necessarily co-dependent. Eakin argues that a rift has opened between representational 
practices based upon multiplicity of voice, subject and textual production and the 
retention in the culture of individualism of “existing models of privacy, personhood, and 
ethics” (186). While suggesting that such models may have to be revised, Eakin also 
maintains that moral responsibilities continue to adhere to the act of writing with or about 
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another because of the harm incipient in the process of textualisation. A life once written 
and published “is accessible to harm. One can strike at a textual body” (172). Although 
elsewhere in his chapter Eakin tends to focus on the potential for harm within life writing 
– constituted through the decisions, the revelations, the inclusions or occlusions made by 
the life writer(s) – here, significantly, he admits to the exposure to harm from without, 
which by implication would include harm resulting from the criticism of life writing.  
 
“One can strike at a textual body” is an acknowledgement that in life writing there is 
vulnerability. This recognition of vulnerability is the basis of G. Thomas Couser’s latest 
work, Vulnerable Subjects (2004), which investigates the ethics of life writing undertaken 
on the behalf of another. Whether through severe disability, radical cultural difference, 
illiteracy or the ultimate silence of death, the subjects of the texts Couser reads are 
vulnerable to exploitation and violation because of their extreme dependency upon others 
for their representation. In such cases, he argues, “(e)thical scrutiny is most urgent” (15). 
 
Couser sets up two theoretical frames that assist in his discussion of ethics and life 
writing. The first draws upon the ethical guidelines of biomedicine and anthropology, as 
the majority of the texts Couser reads in this study fall somewhere within or between the 
spheres of biomedical and ethnographic representation. The concept of fiduciary 
relationships, paralleling those between patient and doctor, facilitate critical 
understanding of the forms of collaborative writing studied. Such relationships are 
defined by the interdependence of trust and vulnerability, where the benefit to the subject 
– in terms of treatment or, in life writing, representation – is (potentially) maximized by 
placing that subject in a position of trust that is (potentially) open to exploitation or abuse 
(17). Qualifying and protecting this fiduciary relationship are the four principles of 
biomedicine: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. For Couser 
the first three are especially salient in life writing. The principle of autonomy is based 
upon respect for the integrity of the person. Here the Kantian edict, common in much 
ethical criticism, is evoked: that a person should not be treated simply as a means but as 
an end; as an autonomous being with motives, goals and rationales that call for 
engagement and respect. In life writing this would mean a respect for “the ideals of 
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agency, responsibility, accountability, and intentionality” (18) rather than an outmoded 
concern with an atomistic self and in this light autonomy can be seen as a quality that 
persists in relationships of interdependency such as those which generate collaborative 
life writing. Further, the biomedical principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence entail 
“obligations to prevent harm or evil, to remove harm or evil, and to do or promote good” 
(27), conditions that Couser sees as useful in approaching life writing ethics as well. He 
admits that it may be difficult or impossible to measure the good resulting from life 
writing, but on the other hand, “it may be proper to expect that writers at least do no harm 
to consenting vulnerable subjects” (28). Avoidance of harm is encoded as a primary 
ethical principle in anthropological statements of ethics as well, and along with concerns 
for consent, disclosure, privacy and reciprocity, bring the two spheres into meaningful 
correspondence. Moreover, anthropology acknowledges that harm can be done to 
communities as well as individuals and Couser is attentive to the implications of this for 
his study of narratives produced in collaboration with marginalised, disabled, or 
disenfranchised subjects whose identity or narratives may not be detachable from the 
community in which they are located. The concern for identifying potential harm 
resultant from engagement in life writing corresponds significantly to the questions raised 
by Eakin and, as we shall see, opens the inquiry, albeit with some reluctance, to questions 
of critical harm. 
 
The second theoretical frame for Couser’s discussion of ethics in life writing is taken 
from Wayne Booth’s The Company We Keep (1988). In his chapter titled “Making, 
Taking, and Faking Lives: Voice and Vulnerability in Collaborative Life Writing,” 
Couser extracts from Booth’s investigation of ethics in fiction a set of key questions that 
are equally or perhaps more compelling when applied to life writing: “What are the 
author’s responsibilities to those whose lives are used as ‘material’? What are the 
author’s responsibilities to others whose labor is exploited to make the work of art 
possible? What are the responsibilities of the author to truth?” (Vulnerable Subjects, 34). 
In terms of collaborative life writing these three questions allow Couser’s discussion of 
ethical obligations to range across issues including property – the copyright and 
 5
ownership concerns resulting from the making of texts; narrative appropriation – taking 
another’s story as one’s own; and ventriloquy – faking the voice of another. 
 
Focusing on the ethical obligations of the author or writer of collaborative works seems 
to apportion a greater share of power towards the maker of the text, but Couser is careful 
to distinguish situations in which this may be the case from collaborations where power 
may in fact reside with the narrating subject. Couser proposes, therefore, a continuum 
based on power-recognition. At one end would be located ethnographic life histories, in 
which he sees the subject holding little power or control over textual production. At the 
other end would be ghost-written or as-told-to celebrity autobiographies in which the 
high commodity value of the subjects’ story results in their exercising greater power. In 
the middle may be found collaborations in which partners are more or less equal in terms 
of their influence over the text, as might be the situation in co-authored narratives of 
intimate or familial relationships (40). Ethical issues exist in each, though the critic’s 
focus will be different depending upon at which end of the spectrum the text falls. 
According to Couser:  
In cases, especially ethnographic ones, in which the model or source is taken 
advantage of by the writer, the ethical duty of the critic may be to defend the 
disenfranchised subject; in the case of celebrity autobiography, the ethical 
duty of the critic may be to protect the historical record (46). 
 
In Couser’s comments on the duties of the critic, the focus again is on identifying harm: 
harm to the subject of the narrative, or falsification of the historical record. Although 
Couser ends his chapter with the cautionary words that “we must be attentive to the 
benefits as well as the liabilities of collaboration” (55), his point earlier that benefits may 
be difficult to define or impossible to measure means that critical attention by default 
seems to concentrate on the occasions of harm resulting from collaboration. 
 
This critical enthusiasm for identifying harm, derived from the ethical concerns of 
biomedicine and anthropology already discussed, is also inherent in Booth’s set of 
questions regarding author and reader responsibilities. Couser draws his three key 
questions from Booth’s list of nine questions pertaining to the author’s obligations. 
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However, Booth also asks a corresponding series of questions regarding the role of the 
reader, and although Couser makes no reference to this it is reasonable to assume that 
these readerly obligations would relate to the ethical duties of the critic. Interestingly, the 
questions Couser selects regarding the author are collapsed into one in the comments 
Booth directs towards readerly duties. After considering the reader’s responsibilities to 
the writer, the work of art, to other readers and to society, Booth dispenses with those 
duties that would relate most directly to collaboration thus: “The remaining 
responsibilities of the reader – to those whose lives are used or abused by the author, or to 
truth – can both be put in the form of a responsibility to point out authors’ successes and 
failures in meeting their responsibilities” (The Company We Keep, 137). 
 
This displacement of obligations is carried over into the recent critical work on life 
writing and ethics. Both Couser and Eakin offer readings that are for the most part 
attentive to the motives, goals and rationales of the multiple participants of collaborative 
life writing. Yet the critical concern for harm and the relative ease with which harm may 
be demonstrated compared to the difficulties of ascertaining benefit mean that the weight 
of critical comment tends to fall upon the textual choices made by the writer, compiler or 
editor of collaborative works. Couser in particular employs the critical strategy of seeking 
out occasions in which the subjectivity of the vulnerable collaborator has been over-
written by the decisions of his or her partner in textual construction. In creating “a 
plausible simulacrum of the subject’s voice” (49), the writing partner may produce a form 
of representation which actually elides the conditions of disadvantage experienced by the 
vulnerable other and which have necessitated the collaboration in the first place. Thus the 
questions of responsibility to the historical record and to those whose lives are the focus 
of the narratives tend to be answered by taking the writer’s decisions to task. Defending 
the vulnerable, then, is achieved primarily through engagement with the collaborator 
perceived as most responsible for textual construction. 
 
To be fair, in many of the collaborative works he reads Couser takes his cue for the 
analysis of harm from assertions of betrayal made either by one of those involved in 
collaboration or by informed others. In his opening chapter he examines betrayal 
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occurring, on the one hand, between a journalist and a convicted murderer in the telling 
of the latter’s life story, and on the other hand, in a daughter’s writing of her mother’s 
condition of epilepsy. In each case, betrayal is expressed by one of the parties at the 
published outcome. In another chapter Couser reads the memoir of a man’s experience of 
raising an adopted son impaired by fetal alcohol syndrome and while betrayal is not 
expressed by the participants in this collaboration, Couser cites a number of Native 
American critics who respond with anger to the book’s representation of the son who is 
Lakota and to the author’s racial politics (208, n5&n8).  
 
In other cases, however, Couser chooses to read for harm where calls of betrayal are 
absent. In his chapter on life writing and euthanasia he defends his critique of 
representations of “good” deaths by advocating an oppositional reading (126). While he 
admits that “(r)eading against the grain may be particularly uncomfortable” in such texts, 
he regards this reading as an obligation: the critic “may reach different conclusions from 
those of the individuals represented” and in publishing his views the critic is not only 
responding to the text but also contributing to the public debate over euthanasia (126-
127). Couser makes it clear that in offering such readings he is “evaluating … public 
representation” not discussing the living or once living participants or their actual 
decisions. His work, he maintains, involves the analysis of “textual figures, not their 
historical counterparts” (127).  
 
This combination of critical maneuvers, directing critical engagement to those perceived 
as holding power and control over textual construction and insisting upon the 
incommensurable distinction between textual figure and historical counterpart, returns us 
to Eakin’s remark that “one can strike at a textual body,” and opens up the possibility of 
critical harm, for to strike is also to risk inflicting injury. I have given extensive 
consideration to the work of Eakin and Couser as their critiques of life writing and ethics 
in important respects parallel critical work that has focused on collaborative Indigenous 
life writing: reading power primarily in the hands of writers and editors; reading the 
Indigenous life narratives as texts separate from their historical producers; and reading 
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for harm and betrayal occasioned by collaborative writing. This combination, I believe, 
entails considerable risk which has not been addressed in the literature on critical ethics.2  
 
                                                Critical Harm 
 
Risk begins with publication. Both in life writing and in criticism, textual construction 
invites scrutiny and prompts dialogue in the form of public debate and published replies. 
Dialogue is contingent, however, upon the possibility of exchange. It is an exchange of 
views, readings and interpretations among all those involved and interested in the issue 
being discussed. Yet in the case of collaborative life writing and its critics it seems this 
dialogue is skewed to exclude the participation of those the critics insist they have 
greatest concern for: “those who are customarily on the receiving end of life writing, 
those who get represented by others, often without their permission” (Vulnerable 
Subjects, 198). This, in my view, is the most serious form of injury resulting from much 
of the criticism being trained on collaborative Indigenous life writing: the failure to 
accord the Indigenous producers of the collaborative texts full status as ethical partners 
and interlocutors in the public debates generated by their work. 
 
This potential for harm can be found in the criticism of cross-cultural collaboration in 
Australian Aboriginal life writing production where it has been an element of some of the 
earliest responses to the genre. Among these, the most important in terms of establishing 
critical direction is the work of Colin Johnson. Although recently Johnson’s right to claim 
Aboriginal identity has been contested, his articles in the 1980s provided what was then 
read as an Aboriginal critic’s response to non-Indigenous involvement in Aboriginal 
literary production and his work continues to be influential.3  
                                                 
2 In the most recent collection of critical essays edited by Eakin, this preponderance of attention to harm 
has shifted to include a number of articles investigating the good of life writing. In criticism of cross-
cultural collaboration in Indigenous life writing, identifying harm without consideration of potential good, 
or consultation with those involved, remains a critical strategy apparently unaware of its repercussions, as 
the following sections will argue. 
3 See Anita M. Heiss’s comments in Dhuuluu- Yala To Talk Straight: Publishing Indigenous Literature (3-
8). Heiss acknowledges the impact Johnson has made on Aboriginal studies in Australia and decides to 




In “White forms, Aboriginal content” Johnson takes issue with the manner in which 
Aboriginal life stories were contained within non-Indigenous discursive systems. 
Surveying a number of early collaboratively produced Aboriginal life stories, Johnson 
objects to editorial intrusions which traded “authenticity” for readability. He dismisses 
Lamilami Speaks (1975), the life story of Reverend Lazarus Lamilami of the Goulburn 
Islands of Australia’s Northern Territory, published in 1974 through the involvement of 
anthropologists Roland and Catherine Berndt, as readable but lacking in a personal style 
identifiable as Aboriginal.  
 
In “Captured Discourse, Captured Lives,” Johnson criticises Reading the Country (1984), 
by Krim Benterrak, Stephen Mueke and Paddy Roe for its subjugation of Aboriginal 
discourse to non-Indigenous systems of representation. Unlike Roe and Muecke’s 
Gularabulu (1983) in which non-Indigenous commentary is minimal, in Reading the 
Country Paddy Roe’s Aboriginal narratives are accompanied by Muecke’s theoretical 
passages and graphics by Benterrak. While others have praised the work as dialogic, 
Johnson sees the text as indicative of  
the position of the Aborigine in modern Australia. Aboriginal discourse is 
captured. Paddy Roe the storyteller becomes discourse segments imprisoned 
within the standard English text of Stephen Muecke, and his country suffers 
the same fate in being captured within the graphics of Krim Benterrak (27).  
 
Johnson objects to Muecke’s expanded claim upon textual space, his editorial prerogative 
“to share the body of the text” paralleling “the reality of Aboriginal communities being 
penetrated and manipulated by European advisors” (27). Muecke’s textual intrusions are 
read as part and parcel of the colonial structures dominating the production of Aboriginal 
literary representation and Johnson goes on to situate Muecke and Row’s texts within the 
body of collaborative work published at that time, including the life stories collected and 
edited by anthropologist Bruce Shaw with Aboriginal stockmen Grant Ngabidj and Jack 
Sullivan.4 Here, Johnson takes exception to editorial intrusion and the assimilation of 
Aboriginal discourse into Standard English as, unlike Roe’s narratives, those of Ngabidj 
                                                 
4 See Ngabidj and Shaw; and Sullivan and Shaw. 
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and Sullivan underwent considerable translation from their original Kriol. To Johnson, 
such collaborative work at best results in “dubious productions” and “compromised 
volumes” (29) in which Aboriginal discourse is reconstructed to become more palatable 
to its mainstream non-Indigenous readership. As well, according to Johnson, these 
narratives are notable for “the absence of critical and political comment on the part of the 
subject” (30). He contrasts these colonial collaborations with Bropho’s Fringedweller 
(1980) and Elsie Roughsey’s An Aboriginal mother tells of the old and the new (1984), 
which both display in their published texts features of their oral origins and an awareness 
of their colonial conditions; thus they retain for Johnson their “authenticity.” Johnson 
closes his article with reference to the covers of these publications, there again reading 
non-Aboriginality in the Krim, Muecke and Row text as in Shaw’s books with Ngabidj 
and Sullivan, with the implied view that the Aboriginal participant had no input into 
design issues, reinforcing his argument that Aboriginal discourse is contained. 
 
In his later work, Johnson (publishing in the 1990s as Mudrooroo Narogin, then 
Mudrooroo) continued his critique of non-Indigenous involvement in Aboriginal life 
writing, taking to task Margaret Somerville’s collaboration with Patsy Cohen in the 
production of Ingelba and the Five Black Matriarchs (1990). The book is the life story of 
Patsy Cohen as well as a community narrative bringing together the recollections of 
elders who had lived on the Aboriginal reserve of Ingelba in Anaiwan country in northern 
New South Wales. In Indigenous Literature of Australia: Milli Milli Wangka (1997), 
Mudrooroo fixes upon the disagreement between Somerville and Cohen regarding the 
textual presentation of the recorded oral narratives. Whereas in commentary on previous 
texts, Mudrooroo had praised those that display their oral origins and dismissed those 
which transformed Aboriginal discourse into standard English, with regard to Ingelba he 
reverses his stand, as Patsy Cohen had objected to a literal transcription of her sections of 
narrative, preferring a more standardised version. Although authenticity – as Johnson had 
previously defined it – would have been thus forfeited, the Aboriginal co-author’s wishes 
should have been respected and the fact that Cohen ultimately acquiesced to Somerville’s 
priorities meant that decision making had been taken away from the Aboriginal author 
(186). Mudrooroo also objects to Somerville’s heightened visibility in the text, repeating 
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in a way his criticism of Muecke’s presence in Reading the Country marking the white 
editor’s reluctance to surrender textual space. 
 
It should be clear that throughout Johnson/Mudrooroo’s work is the implied view that the 
Aboriginal participants in the life writing projects he criticises are vulnerable subjects 
who have surrendered control of their narratives to the non-Indigenous editors who then 
commodify and transform Aboriginal stories to meet their own ends. To this extent he 
seems to be practicing what Couser refers to as the defense of the disenfranchised 
subject. Certainly in the case of Patsy Cohen his criticism is justified to the extent that her 
dissatisfaction over the representation of her spoken discourse was made public through 
Somerville’s subsequently published commentary on the collaboration.5 This 
disagreement over representation, however, has not been sufficient cause for Cohen 
herself to disown the book, which she continues to value and which her family and her 
community continue to read.6 In this regard, one wonders what Aboriginal readers in the 
Kimberley make of Shaw’s work with Ngabidj and Sullivan, or Maung readers of 
Lamilami’s life story and whether they would share Johnson’s view that these 
collaborative works are “dubious productions.” Shaw responded to Johnson’s criticisms 
by insisting upon the recognition of the involvement and agency of his Aboriginal 
collaborators throughout the production of their life stories: their control over the oral 
performances, their vetting of the transformed English versions of their stories, their 
understanding of their situation within the framework of colonisation, their decision-
making regarding the book titles and their contributions to the book covers. Johnson’s 
comments upon these earlier collaborative exchanges give little thought to the Aboriginal 
involvement and investment in the texts and in directing comment and criticism towards 
the non-Indigenous editor, the Aboriginal collaborators are in effect spoken over, as if 
their participation in the work, their interest in its circulation, or their response to its 
publication are not matters of critical concern. 
                                                 
5 See Cohen and Somerville, “Reflections on Ingelba;” and Somerville, “Life (Hi)story Writing: The 
Relationship Between Talk and Text.” 
6 I base this comment on telephone interviews with both Patsy Cohen and Margaret Somerville conducted 
during the course of research for my PhD thesis, “Cross Talk: Collaborative Indigenous Life Writing in 
Australia and Canada.” Patsy Cohen interview, February 12, 2003; Margaret Somerville interview, 
December 11, 2002. 
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The criticisms raised in Mudrooroo’s work have been reformulated recently by Michele 
Grossman in her article “Bad Aboriginal Writing: Editing, Aboriginality, Textuality.” 
Grossman’s argument is directed towards the reluctance of some non-Indigenous editors 
of Aboriginal life writing to forego the performance of “overseer” status, not only 
controlling the construction of Aboriginal representations but also textualising their 
performance and thereby diminishing Aboriginal authority over these particular life 
narratives. Most often this performance of control appears in the introductory material 
which frames the Indigenous narrative. Grossman is concerned that editorial discussions 
of the terms of collaboration in some Aboriginal life writing texts – and she locates 
Ingelba and the Five Black Matriarchs among them – emphasise an abdication on the 
part of the Indigenous narrator of responsibility for textual construction that she claims is 
disingenuous. According to Somerville, Cohen was reluctant to become involved in the 
writing process. Somerville explains: “she wanted me to write the book and she was 
reluctant to read material for editing. Patsy always preferred to talk about the material 
and took greater pleasure in listening to the tapes than in reading the written form” 
(Ingelba, xv). Grossman, however, reads Cohen’s lack of interest as resulting not from 
disinclination but from possible frustration following disagreement with Somerville over 
presentation of the oral narrative. In subsequently published articles, Somerville admits 
that upon seeing the transcripts Cohen was concerned by the appearance on the page of 
her Aboriginal English but eventually acquiesced to the textualised version which 
accurately reflected the spoken words of the contributors. Grossman argues, however, 
that this outcome results in “denying Patsy Cohen textual agency in relation to the 
representation of her own words…” (164), making Ingelba, through inference from the 
title of Grossman’s critique, bad Aboriginal writing. 
 
Grossman’s objections closely parallel those of Johnson/Mudrooroo: Somerville’s 
insistence on literal transcriptions despite Cohen’s reluctance to see her contributions to 
the narrative published in a form that she felt would bring her shame; and Somerville’s 
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textual presence, her performance of her status as text-builder.7 The same criticisms 
appear in Gillian Whitlock’s The Intimate Empire: Reading Women’s Autobiography, 
where she argues in her brief discussion of Ingelba that Cohen is “doubly silenced” in 
Somerville’s work (165).  All three critics have been prompted to this line of criticism by 
Somerville’s reporting upon the collaborative process, both in the introduction to Ingelba 
and in subsequent publications. Patsy Cohen’s dissatisfaction with seeing her speech 
rendered literally is an important aspect of their collaboration and Somerville rightly 
relays this to their reading public. Their disagreement and its outcome do give a vital 
perspective on the power relations between the two women. Yet the direction of critical 
comment outlined above indicates that this disagreement is being read as the one feature 
of the text worth commenting upon. The critical insistence upon this as the most 
significant feature of the text, and in consequence the critical dismissal of the book as 
being compromised by its perceived failure to overcome its colonial foundations, is 
precisely the sort of criticism that itself may occasion harm. In identifying harm through 
an abuse of power, in writing to defend an Aboriginal woman perceived as vulnerable, 
critics are again writing over and thus devaluing the Aboriginal contribution to the text. 
 
The impact of published critical responses to life writing on those whose lives and labour 
have contributed to the text is a matter that critics tend to treat lightly. Couser, for 
example, argues that critics’ “actual influence is often not very substantial. For better or 
worse, such critics are hardly in a position to suppress writers who reach audiences quite 
independently of academic sanction” (199). Elsewhere, however, Couser admits that the 
ethical criticism of life writing is both retrospective and prospective: that critical attention 
to potential ethical violations in life writing has bearing upon both previously published 
texts and future collaborative projects (55). If this is the case, then certainly critical 
comment could have some influence, however “indirect and diffuse” (55), upon issues 
such as a publisher’s decision to reprint a text that has come to be widely read as 
violating the intentions of its Indigenous participants. This is especially relevant in the 
context of Australian publishing where both mainstream publishers and smaller presses 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of shame in the context of Indigenous life writing see Rosamund Dalziell’s Shameful 
Autobiographies: Shame in Contemporary Australian Autobiographies, 113-173. 
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alike are increasingly sensitive to the politics of representation. The fact that Ingelba has 
never been reprinted may not be attributable to the dismissive treatment of its critics, but 
this fact nonetheless has direct consequences upon local Indigenous readers who have not 
been able to buy the book for more than a decade and so cannot replace copies that have 
become worn, damaged, or lost.8 Given that the purpose of the book for many of its 
Aboriginal contributors in the Armidale region was that of a keeping place for memory 
and narrative, it is surely a major disappointment that Ingelba is no longer available for 
purchase. 
 
My point, again, is that critical responses focusing on perceived harm and abuse in the 
collaborative processes do so often without proper engagement with the participants 
deemed to have been exploited. Stephen Connors sees voice as being key to the 
possibility of ethical engagement. Voice “marks the limit of the ethical,” he writes. “That 
which has no voice, or which utters inarticulately, has no place in or positive bearing 
upon ethics” (232). His remarks are especially pertinent to criticism which claims to 
defend vulnerable subjects, and in the present discussion, that which focuses upon 
collaborative Indigenous life writing. For if through textual analysis the critic decides that 
the vulnerable subject has been over-written, her preferences for textual representation 
not respected, or her subject position trapped within discursive folds beyond her control, 
then voice in such texts must be read as missing. Grossman concludes just this in the case 
of Ingelba when she writes that “if we want to locate Patsy Cohen through her own words 
and choices as a textual subject, we will have to look and to read elsewhere” (164).  In 
criticism which is rigorous in its insistence that its target is the text and that textual 
figures are sundered through publication from their historical counterparts, the 
disposition to read for compromise and harm, for occasions of over-writing, or for 
instances of the silencing of the Indigenous subject has the ironic result of removing the 
                                                 
8 According to Somerville, there were never enough copies available to meet local demand even when the 
book was first released and as copies have been lost or damaged in the intervening years the issue of access 
to the book by those whose lives or whose families contributed to its making is becoming difficult. Despite 
the fact that Ingelba is on reading lists for university courses across the country, the publisher, Allen & 
Unwin, will not consider reprinting the text. For local readers, including Patsy Cohen, this is a source of 
ongoing disappointment. In interview, Somerville said that at one point there was some possibility of 
Aboriginal Studies Press obtaining permission to reprint the book, but this has not eventuated. (Telephone 
interview with Margaret Somerville, December 11, 2002) 
 15
Indigenous participants of collaboration from the field of critical engagement. Eakin 
commenting on ethnographic life writing writes that “obviously such works are published 
to serve the purposes of the ethnographer who signs as author” and the Indigenous 
subject distanced by language, class or culture “can have little or no conception of these 
purposes” (How Our Lives,174). Although Eakin is not commenting directly on 
Australian Aboriginal life writing, his remark is relevant because the view he expresses is 
one that can be recognised as operating unacknowledged in critical work from diverse 
fields, including the critiques of collaborative writing offered by Johnson and retained as 
undercurrent in critiques of collaborative Indigenous life writing still on offer today. 
Perceived as lacking control or conception of what has become of their narratives, the 
views and potential responses of Indigenous collaborators are thus discounted in critical 
commentary addressed towards the decisions of the non-Indigenous writer or the wider 
constraining mechanisms of non-Indigenous discourse production. In such critical 
responses to collaboration, the Indigenous subject has indeed been doubly silenced.  
 
“To give voice, or be capable of giving voice, it is necessary to have been given voice. To 
count as an ethical partner, one must be a potential interlocutor,” writes Connor (233). 
With this in mind, it is worthwhile asking whether critics of collaborative life writing 
consider the vulnerable subjects whose textual formations they analyse as potential 
interlocutors, that is, as potential readers of critical work. For Couser, the answer would 
be no, as most of the texts with which he is concerned involve death or such severe 
disability as to negate the possibility of response. In the case of collaborative Indigenous 
life writing, however, this clearly is not the case. In many situations, the Indigenous 
producers of collaborative texts may be quite capable of reading academic treatments of 
their work and if the producers of the life narrative text are not themselves readers, then 
their children and grandchildren most certainly are. Illiteracy therefore is less of an 
excuse today than in previous decades for the critical disregard for the vulnerable subject 
as reader. Nor is the fact that much of the critical commentary on collaborative life 
writing is published in academic journals of limited readership an excuse for overlooking 
the potential for engagement with Indigenous producers of collaborative texts. Digital 
access to many journals means that once a critic’s views are published – made public – 
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they circulate along potentially unforeseen channels and it is incumbent upon those who 
are privileged through education and career to be able to write about others’ lives and 
others’ texts to consider those others as readers and as interlocutors. 
 
                                          Critical Collaboration 
 
Is it not the case that in defending the vulnerable the critic is in effect speaking for 
another perceived as being unable to speak for herself? Linda Alcoff makes the point that 
speaking about others or about the textual representations of others often seeps over into 
speaking for them, making it difficult to disentangle the two practices. In both speaking 
for and speaking about others, the critic is “engaging in the act of representing the other’s 
needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are” (9), Alcoff writes. Such representations, 
she insists, have consequences. “Even if someone never hears of the discursive self I 
present of them they may be affected by the decisions others make after hearing it” (10). 
This is precisely the issue I alluded to above in discussing the impacts of criticism on 
channels of publication and dissemination. While certainly diffuse and indirect and 
therefore difficult to trace, the pathways opened by critical commentary do return to those 
commented upon in one form or another. And if this is the case, it may be appropriate for 
critics to reflect upon their authority and upon the possibility of consultation with those 
being spoken over. Alcoff sees this as an unlikely scenario as “(i)ntellectual work has 
certainly not been guided by the mandate to get permission from those whom one is 
speaking for and about” (11). Yet in the academic landscape that has emerged through 
the 1990s and into the present decade, consultation with Indigenous subjects whose work 
is the focus of one’s research and scholarly comment is not such a fanciful suggestion. 
Given the postcolonial turn that has marked both literary studies and anthropology with a 
heightened attentiveness to the imbrications of knowledge-generation and processes of 
subjugation/domination active in both disciplines, consultation has in some situations 
become a prerequisite. 
 
Although the compound issue of representation and consultation has radically changed 
the practice of anthropology over the past two decades, literary studies seems to have 
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fixed upon the first of these terms while largely ignoring the second. But just as 
anthropology’s crisis of authority began with the recognition of the rhetorical basis of its 
knowledge production and from this moved to a reflection upon the partiality of its 
representations which in conjunction with the increased politicisation of the peoples once 
studied resulted in demands from both within and without the discipline for greater 
consultation and ethical engagement with its subjects, so too may literary studies move 
towards such engagement and, I would argue, a more ethical practice. Especially when 
literary criticism involves the work of non-Indigenous scholars commenting upon 
Indigenous representations, engagement becomes crucial.  
 
On the other hand, there is, of course, a key distinction between the methodologies of the 
two disciplines that problematise such a shift in literary criticism. Anthropology’s 
reliance on fieldwork for its source material means that it is forced to negotiate with those 
whose narratives, knowledge systems and material and representational practices supply 
the discipline with its subject matter and has led in recent practice to the recognition of 
reciprocity and the need for the return of benefits to those whose labour/knowledge has 
been treated as resource. Literary theory thus far has been exempt from such lived and 
embodied entanglements. The textual basis of its source material means that knowledge 
can be constructed without regard for the persons whose representational practices, 
because they are published, have entered the public domain and become available for all 
to make of what they will. “There is nothing outside the text” (158), Derrida exhorts and 
although his point is not that extra-textual concerns such as politics and historical process 
are somehow split off from what happens in any given text – on the contrary, 
deconstruction aims toward the understanding that politics, history, and social change are 
all thoroughly textual and thus are woven into the fabric of other texts – his words are too 
often taken by textual critics to support a methodology of disengagement. It is this text-
based foundation which excuses the distanced work of the literary critic who finds within 
the stacks of the university library and its document delivery service all the material 
needed for knowledge creation.  
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Anthropologist Jeremy Beckett has lamented that although his discipline has been 
radically reshaped by theoretical insights imported from the fields of philosophy, history, 
and literary and cultural criticism, it seems that the traffic is mostly one-way, and that 
critical thought in other disciplines rarely draws upon the advances made in 
anthropology. He implies that changes in the dynamics of fieldwork and the recognition 
of reciprocity and consultation are aspects that other disciplines could learn from. As 
Couser’s work on ethics in life writing draws on the ethical guidelines active in 
anthropological study, it is not unreasonable to suggest that literary theory might also 
benefit from attention to consultation and the return of research to community. 
 
                                            The Vulnerable Critic 
 
Critical responsibility to the collaborative text and the lives through which the text is 
composed begins with recognising that collaboration is suffused with vulnerability. The 
subject of collaborative life writing is often extremely vulnerable, as Couser argues, but 
so too may the writing or editing partner experience vulnerability, while the collaborative 
text they produce is clearly vulnerable, offering a soft target to critics intent on 
demonstrating the traces of disjunction within collaborative writing.9 I would suggest that 
vulnerability also extends, or should extend, to the readers and critics of collaborative 
Indigenous writing. 
 
As an exchange that exists not solely between a teller and a listener, or co-writers, or a 
writer and an editor, but continues through the channels of dissemination and is activated 
in each reading event, collaboration extends its condition of vulnerability to all who enter 
its sphere. Commenting upon the risks posed to writer, reader and text in postmodern 
reading exchanges, Mark Ledbetter argues: 
The writer’s risk is that no longer is s/he the caretaker of the story, but, rather, 
the narrative is ‘set loose’ upon the world with limitless possibilities. The 
reader’s risk is the loss of her/his personal story, in the light of a newly 
existing story that imposes itself on a pre-existing narrative. And the text runs 
                                                 
9 Regarding the vulnerability of the non-Indigenous ethnographer, see Watson, “Experiences in the Field: 
Negotiating between Selves.” 
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the risk of not being read/heard at all, but rather forced into already existing 
stories of convenience and authority (144). 
 
In the context of collaboration, membership in this exchange increases while the risks to 
each member remain undiminished. The multiple producers of the collaborative text all 
face the certainty of relinquishing control over the narrative they have assisted in shaping. 
“The meanings of an ethnographic account are uncontrollable,” writes James Clifford. 
“Neither the author’s intention, nor disciplinary training, nor the rules of genre can limit 
the readings of a text that will emerge with new historical, scientific, or political projects” 
(120). This relates significantly, though inversely, to the risk that Ledbetter sees facing 
the text: that of not being read or heard because of pre-existing discursive patterns or 
strategies that calcify around the text. Whereas Clifford gestures towards the proliferation 
of meanings, future readers taking the text out of the hands and control of its makers, 
Ledbetter cautions that readings may fossilise under the pressures of discursive habits 
that overrun the particularities to be encountered in the text, again with the similar 
consequence of by-passing the intentions of the producers. This is the vulnerability that 
adheres to collaborative Indigenous texts: that their specifics will be passed over by 
majority critics whose readings for strategies of containment accentuate the fashioning of 
the text and its accommodation to the discursive demands of the dominant culture at the 
cost of slighting the Indigenous narratives and their narrators – slighting in the sense of 
treating slightly, dismissively. On the other hand, Ledbetter’s middle term – the reader’s 
risk – offers more hope for the collaborative context. His understanding of the task of 
reading involves an embrace of vulnerability, an acceptance that one’s own personal 
narrative may be over-written in the encounter with another. “I offer myself to become an 
other,” he writes,  
to read and be read by metaphors other than those of my own making and, in 
turn, to risk the literal destruction of my world – my personal story – as I 
have constructed it. I may be scarred by the other’s story and discover that I 
can only tell my story by reference to the other’s (147). 
 
 
In terms of the reading of Indigenous narratives, Ledbetter’s view may be aligned to the 
suggestion by Whitlock that the autobiographical and testimonial discourse of Indigenous 
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Australians has triggered a sense of crisis among non-Indigenous Australian intellectuals 
(“Strategic Remembering,” 163). The dissemination of Indigenous testimony through 
various channels has prompted numerous non-Indigenous Australian historians to 
reconsider their sense of belonging and reflect upon the moral anxiety that clings to race 
relations and to narratives of nationhood. Whitlock singles out the Bringing Them Home 
report as catalyst but positions this work alongside the many Indigenous autobiographical 
narratives published in recent years. A similar claim could be made for identity discourse 
in Canada following the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and 
sustained by the numerous First Nations autobiographical texts entering the public 
domain. In each country, non-Indigenous readers who acknowledge their vulnerability 
before the story of another have found their own narratives deeply transformed. 
 
In the specific context of collaborative Indigenous life writing, an acceptance of critical 
vulnerability, I suggest, involves two interrelated procedures. The first of these is 
openness to dialogue. This is the starting point for an ethics of critical practice, a 
willingness to engage with those concerned with the same texts and issues and thus a 
willingness to surrender the distanced stance and authority common to textual study. In 
the reading of collaborative Indigenous life writing in Canada, openness to dialogue and 
the critical expression of vulnerability are issues raised by Susanna Egan’s reading of 
Stolen Life: The Journey of a Cree Woman (1998), by Rudy Wiebe and Yvonne Johnson. 
Wiebe and Johnson’s book tells the story of how Johnson came to be the only Native 
woman in Canada serving a twenty-five-year sentence for first degree murder. The 
narrative of her involvement, with three others, in the murder of Leonard Skwarok is 
entangled with narrative of the trauma Johnson experienced from early childhood as she 
recalls repeated sexual abuse from both family members and strangers. Unable to voice 
her trauma, in part due to the cleft palate with which she was born and which impeded 
her ability to speak, Johnson was drawn into a cycle of substance abuse in her early 
teenage years that continued until the time of the murder. The book comprises both 
extensive first-person narration, taken from interviews with Wiebe and journals Johnson 
wrote in prison, and a framing narrative provided by Wiebe who tells the story of his 
involvement with Johnson and his gradual uncovering of her story, through their 
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correspondence, meetings in prison and telephone conversations and also drawing on 
police and court records, newspaper reports, and interviews with family members. Egan 
begins her article “Telling Trauma: Generic Dissonance in the Production on Stolen Life”  
by acknowledging the disturbance she has experienced in reading Wiebe and Johnson’s 
book, implying the sort of vulnerability that Ledbetter suggests is required of the reader, a 
willingness to be scarred by another’s story. “I find my own disturbance begins with 
Yvonne’s appalling story (no child, ever, anywhere, should suffer as she describes herself 
suffering),” Egan writes, “but concludes with what I perceive as a generic dissonance in 
the narration of her experience” (10-11). Her article then proceeds to analyse and 
document that dissonance by reading Wiebe’s framing narrative and focusing on features 
such as the book-cover design without seriously returning to the disturbance created by 
Johnson’s description of her experiences of suffering, or to Johnson’s own narrative in 
terms of its rhetorical intent. Egan’s emphasis on the framing strategies and her 
reluctance to acknowledge Johnson’s participation in textual construction is consistent 
with her overall thesis, that the Indigenous narrator and subject of Stolen Life has been 
enclosed by discursive systems beyond her control. Her analysis rehearses the claim that 
the Indigenous collaborator is over-written; her subject position determined by the 
strategies of her co-writer, Wiebe, who, according to Egan, “becomes a ventriloquist for 
Yvonne” (22). The analysis, however, is again a case of critical disregard for the 
contribution and agency of the Indigenous participant in collaborative life writing. 
Indeed, although she opens with the disclaimer that her comments are offered “(w)ith 
serious respect for the courage and integrity of both narrators” (11), her article ends by 
asserting “I have been reading Stolen Life with every respect for Rudy Wiebe’s 
intentions, and with no ability to separate myself from them” (26). It is significant that in 
closing Egan no longer claims to be reading with respect for Yvonne Johnson’s 
intentions. Her private reading experience may have maintained this respect and 
engagement with the Indigenous co-producer of the text but her public, published 
response choses not to pursue this reading strategy; Egan directs her comments to Wiebe 
and foregoes the opportunity for dialogue with Johnson. 
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It is interesting to compare Egan’s critical stance in this article with that of Heather 
Hodgson, Cree writer and academic, whose review of Stolen Life appeared in the same 
issue of Canadian Literature as Egan’s. Although in her review she too is critical of 
Wiebe’s editorial intervention and the possibility of appropriation, she also raises the 
crucial issue of consultation. “I was not able to speak with Yvonne at the Ohci Okimaw 
Healing Lodge, as she did not respond to my letter requesting a visit,” Hodgson writes 
(156), and although they did not meet and exchange views, the point is that for Hodgson 
an effort in this direction was deemed necessary. As an academic, Hodgson is 
empowered to publish her reading of Johnson and Wiebe’s book but before doing so she 
attempted to consult with the Indigenous producer of the text. Egan makes no such claim. 
And while it is possible that Egan also attempted to contact Johnson and, like Hodgson, 
received no reply, my point is that her published reading – with its unwavering concern 
for the mechanisms of editorial constraint and its neglect of Johnson’s involvement in 
textual construction and design – does not consider the Indigenous collaborator as a 
potential interlocutor and in effect forecloses the possibility of their engagement in a 
manner that Hodgson’s review does not.10  
 
Consultation and visiting between a literary scholar and the producers of a collaborative 
text result in a trust based relationship and an acknowledgement of vulnerability on all 
sides. Consultation and dialogue of this nature are certainly rare but not unprecedented. It 
is, in fact, the extent of consultation and engagement undertaken in preparation for 
Egan’s published reading of another collaborative work that makes their absence from 
“Telling Trauma” so telling. In her work co-authored with Gabriela Helms, “The Many 
Tongues of Mothertalk: Life Stories of Mary Kiyoshi Kiyooka,” the surviving producers 
of the collaborative text were interviewed, family members met and, with their 
permission, manuscripts consulted. “Both the manuscripts and these interviews implicate 
us as readers,” Egan and Helms write, “drawing us into the ongoing interpretive process 
and the earlier community of collaborators; they are crucial to the discussion that 
                                                 
10 Egan’s critique, I would argue, could not have taken its published form if consultation with Johnson (or 
with Wiebe for that matter) had eventuated. Consultation, with its regard for the intentionality of 
collaboration, results in a relational approach to reading and critique. As my next point demonstrates, Egan 
is keenly aware that consultation alters critique in this manner. 
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follows” (49). The implications of consultation are referred to in several places in Egan 
and Helms’ analysis and commentary, as they recognise the dilemma it poses for critics. 
They ask rhetorically: “And is it our task to pass judgement on each collaborator’s 
contributions and decisions, to determine what is a loss or gain?” (67). Their answer is a 
rejection of “such absolute decisions and evaluations,” opting rather to demonstrate the 
various interventions and their implications as the text they read is passed through the 
hands of several collaborators in a process Egan and Helms call “serial collaboration” 
(67). Their refusal to offer absolute judgement on the text in favour of a tracing of textual 
transformations, made possible through dialogue with the producers, exemplifies this first 
aspect of critical vulnerability involving a concession of critical authority in exchange for 
privileged entry and insight into the processes of collaboration. It is a critical strategy that 
could move the study and reading of collaborative Indigenous life writing to new 
perspectives and new areas of debate, a move and a risk worth taking. 
 
The second aspect of critical vulnerability flows from the first. If the critic’s vulnerability 
is related to a relinquishment of authority in recognition of the producers of collaborative 
texts as potential interlocutors and ethical partners, then, in the case of Indigenous life 
writing, the critic becomes engaged in procedures that move towards the negotiation of 
Indigenous protocols and permissions. Any non-Indigenous academic working and 
publishing within the field of Indigenous studies must be aware of the many calls from 
Indigenous writers, intellectuals and researchers for acknowledgement of the dual 
obligations of consultation and consent. Consultation is the first item on Jackie Huggins’ 
checklist for ethical dealings between non-Aboriginal writers and Aboriginal people (86). 
In terms of commenting upon or teaching Indigenous texts in Canada, Patricia Monture 
Angus notes that before using Maria Campbell’s book Stories of the Road Allowance 
People (1995) in her classes, she sought permission and offered a gift in honour of 
Indigenous protocols (43, n28). Bruce Pascoe underscores the importance of consultation 
and consent in all aspects of Indigenous cultural production: “Writers, artists, musicians 
and historians from the indigenous community must consult with the community every 
step of the way in a manner which white artists would consider anti-art” (84). Although 
non-Indigenous literary critics might also consider consultation to be anti-critique, I argue 
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that to do so would be a refusal to move beyond established bounds of disciplinary 
authority and reading procedures and a reluctance to accommodate critique to 
postcolonial relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous subjects and their 
representations. Negotiating protocols with the producers of Indigenous texts would 
mean accepting the vulnerability associated with learning new rules of engagement, new 
patterns of knowledge construction, and new relationships.  
 
Together consultation and respect for Indigenous protocols open up the possibility of a 
renewed reading practice in the field of collaborative Indigenous life writing. It suggests 
a reading strategy that acknowledges and investigates the mediating procedures that 
shape Indigenous narratives constructed in collaboration with others while maintaining an 
openness to the contributions of all participants and a willingness to be scarred by the 
claims of narrative. It also suggests the opening of a discursive space in which the critic 
can meet the subjects of reading as partners in the construction of meaning, and as 
potential readers of each other’s work. Such an ethics would involve serious 
consideration of the exchange of discourse and the issue of return – the fact that all 
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